Haqqani: Military or political solution?

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Haqqani: Military or political solution?

By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON - Dissension over Admiral Mike Mullen's accusation that the Haqqani network of Afghan insurgents is a "veritable arm" of Pakistan's intelligence agency and the revelation that a United States official met with a Haqqani official have provided new evidence of a long-simmering struggle within the Barack Obama administration over how to deal with the most effective element of the Afghan resistance to US-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.

One issue under debate is whether military force alone can settle the problem of the Haqqani network or if a political settlement is necessary.

The other issue is whether the United States should continue to carry out a drone war against the Haqqani network in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal area in defiance of Pakistan's demand for a veto over the strikes, or reach an accommodation with Pakistan that would narrow the focus of the strikes.

That policy debate pits top military leaders, Pentagon officials and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who want to put priority on pressuring Pakistan to attack the Haqqani forces, against those in the Obama administration who doubt that the military effort can be decisive and support a political approach to that key insurgent force.

The military, the Pentagon and the CIA have been pushing aggressively since late 2010 to get the administration to force the Pakistani military leadership to carry out a major offensive against the Haqqani leadership and forces, despite an intelligence assessment that Islamabad would not change its policy toward the Haqqani group.

Just days before his tenure of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ended, Mullen took advantage of the consternation of the entire Obama administration over the 20-hour siege of the US Embassy and US-NATO headquarters in Kabul on September 13 to raise the issue of Pakistani ties with the Haqqani group at a higher level of intensity.

He sought to exploit what he called "credible evidence" that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) was involved in the planning or execution of the Kabul attacks.

It soon became evident, however, that Mullen was not speaking for a united Obama administration. White House spokesman Jay Carney responded to a question about Mullen's remarks on September 28 by saying it was "not language that I would use".

A September 27 article in the Washington Post quoted an unnamed US official as saying that Mullen's charge was "overstated" and that there was "scant evidence" of ISI "direction or control" over the Haqqani group.

Then Washington Times Pentagon correspondent Bill Gertz suggested on September 28 that the criticism of Mullen was coming from officials in the intelligence community and the State Department, which wanted to relax the pressure on Pakistan over the Haqqani network rather than intensify it.

The critics were calling for cutting back sharply on drone strikes in northwest Pakistan, according to the Pentagon official who leaked the disagreement to Gertz. Their argument, according to Gertz's source, was that continuing the strikes at the present level was unlikely to damage al-Qaeda any more than it already had been.

That argument parallels those made by former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair in an August 14 New York Times op-ed piece.

The vast majority of the drone strikes over the past two years, however, have targeted the Haqqani network, not al-Qaeda or the Pakistani Taliban. The drone war has therefore become the basis for an alliance between the leadership of the CIA and the military in support of pressure on Pakistan's military over its failure to attack the Haqqani network.

The military and the CIA have argued strongly against negotiating with the Haqqani network. In June 2010, CIA director Leon Panetta declared publicly, "We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce al-Qaeda, where they would really try to become part of that society."

That position also reflected the interests of the US military. Panetta's move to the Defense Department and his replacement by General David Petraeus at the CIA ensures that the same alignment of interests will continue.

But the Obama administration's December 2010 strategy review produced a potential alternative to that military-CIA approach.

An intelligence assessment circulated just as the 50-page classified review of progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan was being completed concluded that Pakistan was not likely to agree to carry out a major military operation against the Haqqani group, regardless of US pressures. It also suggested that, without such a change in Pakistan's policy, the US military strategy in Afghanistan couldn't succeed.

That strengthened the hand of those who had been skeptical about the military's approach to the problem. The result, according to sources familiar with the document, was that the strategy review suggested the need for a "political approach" to the insurgency in general and the Haqqani network in particular.

The review, which is described as "diagnostic" rather than "prescriptive", did not mandate such a political approach, nor did it define what it would entail, according to the sources. The political approach "wasn't off the ground yet", one source told Inter Press Service (IPS).

The implication, however, was that the Haqqani network would have to be integrated into the broader US strategy of "dialogue" with the Taliban insurgent leadership, even as military pressure on the insurgents continued. It could not go further than that, because Obama had not made a decision to enter into peace negotiations with the Taliban.

After the December review, Pakistan stepped up its effort to persuade the United States to deal directly with the Haqqani network, telling the Obama administration that it could bring the Haqqanis to the negotiating table.

Despite opposition from the military-Pentagon-CIA phalanx to a Haqqani role in negotiations, those in the State Department and the White House who were backing a broader strategy of negotiations for Afghanistan and hoping to ease tensions with Pakistan supported separate talks with the Haqqani group.

In a hint of the direction US policy was tilting, Mullen, who was no fan of direct contacts with the Haqqani network, declared in June that some members of the network might be open to "reconciliation".

ABC News revealed on The Blotter on October 3 that a US official had met with Ibrahim Haqqani, the son of the patriarch of the organization, Jalaludin Haqqani, a few months before the September 13 Kabul attacks.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is now in day-to-day command of the network, told BBC the same day that the US had raised the possibility of representation of the network in the Afghan government.

Although no US official has confirmed that claim, it is consistent with past efforts to divide the Haqqanis from Taliban leader Mullah Omar, to whom the Haqqanis have pledged their loyalty. On May 5, 2004, Syed Saleem Shahzad reported in Asia Times Online that Siraj Haqqani had confirmed a report Shahzad had received from another source - presumably the ISI - that the United States had offered through the ISI to make Jalaludin Haqqani prime minister. (See Through the eyes of the Taliban.)

The elder Haqqani's response, according to his son, was, "After so much killing of Afghans through 'daisy cutter bombs' and like, shall I sit in the government under US command?"

While rejecting offers to end their resistance war in return for a position in the government, the Haqqanis are ready to join broader negotiations whenever Mullah Omar agrees to begin talks, as was confirmed by a Haqqani network source to Reuters on September 17.

Last week, unnamed US officials were spreading the word to news media that there was reason to believe the Haqqanis were to blame for the assassination of Afghan High Peace Council Burnahuddin Rabbani, despite the apparent absence of any real evidence the group was involved.

That was another indication that the debates over the two Haqqani-related issues are far from being resolved.

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in 2006.

Asia Times Online :: Haqqani: Military or political solution?

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Pakistan: Will Clinton, Kayani Talk to Haqqani Terrorists?

When Hillary Clinton arrived in Islamabad on Thursday night, Oct. 20, Pakistan's General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was wondering why the U.S. Secretary of State had even bothered to stop by and be civil. Earlier in the day, while still in Kabul, Clinton had warned Pakistan's leaders that if they were not willing to take action against Afghan insurgents operating out of Pakistani territory, then they could end up "paying a very big price." Abandoning his customary mumbling, Kayani asked, "If you're going to serve an ultimatum, then what was the point of the visit?"

But four hours later, at 2 a.m., the two fractious allies emerged with the broad outlines of a plan that could see Pakistan play a crucial role in helping the U.S. bring the decadelong war across the border to a close. After weeks of bitter recriminations, both sides say the relationship has been "stabilized" — for the moment. "I think we've done a lot to clear the air," Clinton told reporters on Friday. Quoting Kayani, she added that the two sides are "90% to 95% on the same page." (See pictures of Pakistan's vulnerable North-West Frontier Province.)

Clinton's visit came as relations between Washington and Islamabad plunged to an all-time low. A series of high-profile terrorist attacks in and around Kabul were traced to the Haqqani network, whose leadership is believed to be hiding in a safe haven in the Pakistani tribal areas. In testimony before a U.S. Senate panel, the recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, described the Haqqani network as "a veritable arm" of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. In some ways, the nominal American alliance with Pakistan now hinges on the Haqqani network and what Islamabad can do to stop the group's attacks on U.S. troops.

The decision to entertain talks with the Haqqanis marks a significant shift in U.S. policy after years of deeming the group irreconcilable. During that time, Washington's calls from Islamabad to do more against the group were met with obstinate refusals. "What has been happening is a game of brinkmanship," says a Pakistani military official, explaining how Islamabad perceived events. "They've been pushing, and we've been resisting. We have leverage [when it comes to the Haqqani network], and they wanted to neutralize that leverage." Now, after an initial meeting arranged by the ISI between a member of the Haqqani network and U.S. officials, Washington wants to see if Islamabad can deliver.

In the meetings, Kayani suggested that his army could take some action against the Haqqanis that would "limit" the "space" available to the group. The North Waziristan tribal area, U.S. officials complain, is used as a safe haven and logistical base where wounded fighters return to heal and fresh cross-border attacks are plotted. In recent months, the Pakistani generals have talked among themselves of possible "surgical operations" in the main North Waziristan towns of Mir Ali, Miranshah and Datta Khel. But Pakistan is unlikely to take such action unless a fresh round of attacks by the Haqqani network leaves them with no choice. (See Pakistan's subcultures.)

Washington and Islamabad, however, remain divided on whether the Haqqani talks should carry prerequisites. On her visit, Clinton reiterated that the U.S. expects all groups involved in the so-called reconciliation talks with the Afghan government to renounce violence, disavow al-Qaeda and recognize the constitution of Afghanistan. The Pakistanis say these expectations should instead be "end conditions" for a negotiated settlement. "We know that they are not in our pocket," says the military official, referring to the ISI's murky relationship with the Haqqani network. "If you set down conditions, they'll tell us to go take a hike. They'll say that the U.S. is not winning in the field and so they're not interested." It is for this reason, according to the military official, that Pakistan has insisted it cannot "guarantee a favorable or successful outcome" of the negotiations. It also helps the Pakistanis evade blame for any potential breakdown.

The real question is whether the Pakistanis can deliver the militants to the negotiating table at all. "I have to be very candid with all of you," Clinton told one of her audiences in Islamabad. "We're not sure — that there may be no appetite for talking on the other side, that for ideological reasons or whatever other motivations, there may be no willingness."

Nevertheless, Washington and Islamabad have at least put on an appearance of agreeing to work together — even if the Haqqanis never make it to any negotiations. The Americans, as Clinton noted, are keeping their options open. Indeed, the U.S. is mounting a new military offensive against the group. During the meeting, U.S. officials said they would calibrate their "military tempo" — the pace of action against the Haqqanis — to progress in talks. If there is movement, the U.S. will be prepared to reward them with an easing of pressure.

Meanwhile, the Pakistanis feel gratified that their concerns regarding Afghanistan are being heard. The U.S., says a senior Pakistani military official who was briefed on the meeting, has "more or less accepted our stance on Afghanistan." The Pakistanis are pleased that U.S. officials like Lieut. General Douglas Lute, a special adviser to President Obama, are sensitive to their concerns about the sustainability of the Afghan National Army and police force that are being trained. The military official says Pakistan fears the creation of Afghan security forces that are too large and too pricey to maintain. Without adequate funding, the official adds, the force could break down into warring militias. And without greater Pashtun representation, the Pakistanis fear that a security force of over 400,000 could be vulnerable to Indian influence. A recent security agreement between Kabul and New Delhi heightened that alarm. (See pictures from the suicide bombings in Islamabad.)

The Pakistanis, says the military official, told their U.S. counterparts they would like to hear Washington speak with "one voice." They say they are frustrated by what they perceive as "mixed messages" on the region emanating from different arms of government in Washington. Kayani also expects "clarity" in the process. "Each side," says the military official, "should be clear on what we expect from each other, so our efforts can complement each other." Another Pakistani demand is for time lines to be drawn up, establishing when the process will begin and how long it is expected to last.

The tentative agreements were made between the two high-powered delegations at the Prime Minister's House in Islamabad. On the Pakistani side, Kayani was joined by ISI head Lieut. General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir. On the U.S. side, Clinton's team included General Martin Dempsey, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; David Petraeus, the new CIA director; Mark Grossman, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; and Lieut. General Lute.

Pakistan: Will Clinton, Kayani Talk to Haqqani Terrorists? - Yahoo! News