The promise and limits of drones: Attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan work, but they'

[sonicboom]

The promise and limits of drones: Attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan work, but they're not enough
BY Robert Kinder

Monday, February 14th 2011, 4:00 AM


The five men sat huddled together on the floor of the remote building, deep in the mountains of North Waziristan, in Western Pakistan. Bending over a map, they plotted an attack against a U.S. outpost located just over the border in neighboring Afghanistan. Meanwhile, miles away, a pilot stared intently at the screen in front of her as she remotely piloted one of America's most lethal weapons. Unbeknownst to the men, the unmanned Predator she was flying had acquired their position and was quietly circling thousands of feet above. Two Hellfire missiles crashed through the roof of the home, instantly killing them and curtailing their planned attack on the U.S. base.

Since President Obama took office, such targeted killings in Pakistan have risen dramatically - from just six reported attacks between 2004 and 2007 to 118 attacks in 2010. The drone strikes are a key component in America's strategy to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda. In a recent study produced by the New America Foundation, of the more than 200 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2010, it is estimated that well over 1,000 militants have been killed; of those, 32 have been significant enemy leaders.

At the same time, drone attacks have been criticized from the likes of the ACLU and Amnesty International for allegedly violating the rules of war - killing people, sometimes including noncombatants, in places where war is not formally declared.

Others say that drones kill people we should instead be questioning - that America isn't doing enough to capture Al Qaeda operatives in order to glean from them critical information about the broader global network.

After spending three years each in Afghanistan and Iraq, as both a commander leading special operations missions and later as a counterinsurgency adviser, I've seen the strategy play out up close. And I can say with certainty: There should be no mistake that drones are a vital and effective piece of our strategy to defeat Al Qaeda. But the key word is "piece"; we are at serious risk of relying too heavily on this technologically brilliant weapon. To succeed, our unmanned drones must be complemented by a comprehensive strategy to build Pakistan's and other partner nations' counterterror capabilities, so we grow an international team to disrupt and defeat Al Qaeda around the globe.

As CIA director Leon Panetta said in 2009, drone strikes are "the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the Al Qaeda leadership." The words still ring true. I've seen the frustration that U.S. senior leaders endure as they encourage Pakistani leaders to clear Al Qaeda from their mountains. With the almost complete lack of Pakistani military pressure in the mountainous region of Waziristan, where 88% of the attacks occur, our only option against Al Qaeda is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

But even supporters of drones must acknowledge: There are serious downsides. Often, collateral damage results in the wounding or killing of noncombatant civilians. When this occurs, we are portrayed as "gunslingers" taking justice into our own hands through "extrajudicial" killings.

The key to victory is the strategy we build around the drone strikes. For one, we must focus much more intently on building our partner nations' counterterror forces. Countries like Pakistan often maintain elaborate spy networks of agents which are absolutely critical to identifying friend from foe in remote regions. But these same developing nations too often lack state-of-the-art technological capabilities, such as communications equipment, satellite imagery or real-time video platforms that enable counterterror forces to find their targets and fix their locations in order to capture or kill them.

At the same time, select personnel from each of those same intelligence and technological activities must form fusion cells. Just as our CIA, FBI and NSA come together and share information as it becomes available, handing off information to counterterror ground forces to exploit actionable intelligence while it is still relevant, Pakistan and Afghanistan's intelligence and national security forces must follow our lead.

Since 9/11, the U.S. has been successful in deterring another large-scale attack on our soil. Aggressive U.S. actions against Al Qaeda in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere around the globe have managed to keep terrorists isolated in distant sanctuaries in places like Pakistan and Yemen. Drones are working - but the remote-controlled bombers can't do it all. The time is now to assemble a professional global network of human terror-fighters to find and defeat Al Qaeda operatives wherever they may be.

Kinder, a retired Army officer, spent a year in Afghanistan creating and leading a counterinsurgency advisory team for Gen. Stanley McChrystal, then the U.S. Army commander.They do great work - but we need new human capabilities on the ground, too

The promise and limits of drones: Attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan work, but they're not enough