COMMENT: US-Pakistan: cause, effect and consequences —Shahzad Chaudhry
Pakistan has stood dazed since those direct attacks on Pakistani forward positions. The resulting closure of a supply route was an expression of the hurt, anger and disbelief that the people of Pakistan experienced after having invested in cooperating in an unpopular war over the last nine years
Sometime in 2007, former President Bush signed off an internal security memo authorising important operational changes to the US forces in Afghanistan. Not only could the drone attacks be increased on the Pakistan side of the border, they could be conducted without prior intimation to the Pakistanis. By then, within the US intelligence system it was quite convincingly perceived that the Pakistani intelligence was in cahoots with the militant groups and pre-warned them of impending US attacks. Two, the US forces when engaged with militant combatant groups could violate the Pakistani border in ‘hot pursuit’ if there was a reasonable chance of finishing the terrorists off within six kilometres beyond the border. And, finally, if and when any of the ‘big guns’ (the top three) of al Qaeda and the Taliban were located, the US forces were authorised in necessary strength to decimate the targets without being inhibited by the Pak-Afghan boundary. The memo was leaked to the press subsequently and Pakistan registered its protest. The first signs of a changing US operational application emerged with the increasing frequency of drone attacks in the FATA region and absence of any prior coordination of intelligence.
When Obama took over in January 2008, one of his first orders of business was a brief on the Afghan theatre. He was briefed on President Bush’s authorisation of enhanced operations. Reportedly, he expressed surprise at why such facilitation was not being fully exploited. He ordered an immediate increase in the frequency of drone attacks. This has remained the principal plank of the US strategy to counter al Qaeda and Taliban groups lodged in the mountainous recesses of the Pak-Afghan border. It has also subsequently been proposed as the main underlying strategy for the counter-terrorism (CTR) approach by Vice President Biden as an alternate to the currently ongoing counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan. This must have warmed the hearts of those in favour of the CTR approach against the COIN enactment.
For Pakistan, since 2008, the drone saga has acquired a different dimension: its blowback and retaliatory suicide bomb blasts by militant organisations have risen in proportion, causing widespread death and destruction in the major cities of Pakistan.
NATO’s recent excursions beyond the Afghan border in ‘hot pursuit’ of the extricating Afghan militants into Pakistani territory were the manifestation of the next level of the authorised enhanced operations. This has roots in another parallel development at the command level in Afghanistan. When Petraeus took over from McChrystal, he faced an oft-repeated rant of the US soldiers complaining of stringent rules of engagement that were akin to fighting with one arm tied. McChrystal had ordained that since the ultimate objective was to win ‘hearts and minds’ as a part of the COIN strategy, US troops were to err on the side of civilians’ safety and avoid collateral damage to the maximum extent possible. He was conscious of Karzai’s sensitivity to such losses and the consequential unpopularity of US forces in Afghanistan. Petraeus changed that and handed flexibility back to the commander on the ground. Safety of the troops became the dominant intent and for that any and every action was justifiable within the fold of the permissible ambit of operations. Petraeus of Fallujah fell back to his experience of application of ruthless force to establish dominance. If this leads us to a better understanding of the renewed resurgence in the aggressive spirit of the US and NATO forces, that should explain their offensive mould.
How do command prerogatives conflict with the broad policy direction and strategic aims of an undertaking? Such delegation of flexibility may be a popular move but it brought to head fissures and chasms in heretofore complementary strategies of both the US and Pakistan. Tactical variations apart, both sides have till now endeavoured sanitisation of the troubled FATA regions, which has been the essential underlying plank of the American adventure. Unnecessary bravado and display of vulgar aggression counterpoise the need to work together in achieving perhaps this century’s most defining objectives currently being pursued in Afghanistan and FATA.
Pakistan has stood dazed since those direct attacks on Pakistani forward positions. The resulting closure of a supply route was an expression of the hurt, anger and disbelief that the people of Pakistan experienced after having invested in cooperating in an unpopular war over the last nine years that only multiplied Pakistan’s difficulties with huge losses in life, property and opportunity. Pakistan might take ages to recover to the pre-2007 performance levels of its economy and yet a set of changed preferences, sometimes as command discretion, can unleash most damaging strategic consequences. This stands as the most probable underlying cause. The second, much more disconcerting, is a question on the real US effort to up the ante and test Pakistan with a policy shift in taking the war overtly into Pakistani lands. This will place Pakistan into a most damaging and dangerous collision path. Its people may have become immune to repeated drone attacks but will never stand in support of an American invasion of its territories.
A repeat is likely to push Pakistan to bring a complete closure to US and NATO logistic routes. This will bring the US into direct confrontation with Pakistan. In the follow up to the US incursions, there were clear signs of the US’ displeasure in seeing a dependent state — militarily, economically and politically — challenging what, to the Americans, appeared operational necessity. Such an excursion may have also carried a residual trust deficit with the Pakistanis when the prism that the Americans use to determine progress in Afghanistan has only US colours. The consequence of a lack of trust and coordination between the two after nine years of carrying the yoke has nothing but disaster writ large for the entire region. The domestic political situation in the US may seek a desperate trophy to salvage an electoral victory back home by hunting beyond borders and hence a respectable exit to meet stated timelines, but it will infest Pakistan with messier and untenable instability. By externalising their war, the US might save face in Afghanistan but will unleash such dynamics by its aggressive intent in Pakistan that its strategic objectives of stability to both society and a nuclear state will be rendered asunder under the weight of the direct confrontation that is sure to follow. Pakistan will have little choice than to measure up to the contending challenge of an imposed dynamic. It may also reverse the favourable dynamics for the US in both Afghanistan and FATA, and that will certainly be counted as the worst failure in US military history.
Will Obama reverse the endorsement of the Bush position on the war? Unlikely. He has said as much in recent days, which leaves the possibility of a recurrence very much alive. The script then will have to be clearly played out with much greater responsibility on both sides, sidestepping tactical differences, focusing on strategic gains and a shared end-state, which can be the only worthy outcome of a long, costly, and perhaps unnecessary war.
The writer is a defence and political analyst
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
COMMENT: US-Pakistan: cause, effect and consequences
Linear Mode
