Pak-US Relationship

[Neo]

Newly passed aid bill far less stringent than original version

* Kerry-Lugar Bill acknowledges Pakistan as critical friend, ally and recognises Islamabad’s sacrifices in fight against terrorism

WASHINGTON: The Kerry-Lugar Bill on the $7.5 billion assistance for Pakistan from 2010 to 2014, unanimously passed by the US Senate on Thursday is far less restrictive than its original version.

The same version of the bipartisan bill was introduced in the US House of Representatives on Thursday, after US President Barack Obama hailed the development and reaffirmed a strong commitment to Pakistan's economic development. The measure, subject to progress made during this period, would authorise $1.5 annually for Pakistan over the next five years.

Experts on US-Pakistan relations said US Congressional legislation on Pakistan aid in 1980s required 12 odd waivers from the US president for the aid to go through. They pointed out that the waivers required certification in the fields of democracy, human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, drugs etc.

Contrastingly, the Kerry-Lugar legislation was far less restrictive and required certification at the level of secretary of state. Named the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, the Bill has strong support of the Departments of State and Defence and is a compromise between legislation previously introduced in the House, and then the Senate.

Acknowledgement: The bill also acknowledges Pakistan as a critical friend and ally and recognises the profound sacrifices it has made in the war on terror.

According to legislative experts, the bill is far less prescriptive and stringent in its language than the original version. Specific references to India as well as Abdul Qadeer Khan, contained in the previous version, had been eliminated.

The language related to nuclear proliferation is markedly toned down to ensure access of US investigators to individuals suspected to receiving cooperation "in efforts such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks".

In addition, there is a waiver for almost every condition. Besides, the bill requires a waiver from the "secretary of state and not from the president" as was proposed in the House version.

The bill authorises that funds may be provided for FMF, counter insurgency capability and IMET programs. It underlines the importance of supporting Pakistan's national security needs to fight the ongoing counter-insurgency and improve its border security and control.

The bill underlines the importance of supporting Pakistan's national security needs to fight the ongoing counter-insurgency and improve its border security and control. app

[Neo]

A new beginning

Monday, September 28, 2009

It is now quite clear the US will remain engaged in Pakistan for some time to come. The significant aid packages that have been announced mean that there is no possibility of a swift pull out from the region. There are two ways of looking at this. There can be no doubt at all that the US has played a negative, neo-imperialist role in the region – for many decades and most notably since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As the US secretary of state has herself said, it has over this time contributed greatly to the problems faced today. There is a lot to be said for a US pullout. It is hard to believe this would not help resolve matters, especially as hatred for the US has given rise to much of the angst and violence we face.

On the other hand, when we take a realistic assessment of the grim situation we face, there must be some doubt as to whether we can cope with it on our own. Many classical theories about how the world works stand in ruins: the Taliban are fiercely opposed to Washington, they also align themselves – in theory at least – with the poor and oppose feudalism. But they are never the less highly undesirable; even more so than the US. This then is the quandary we must live with. Perhaps Washington should be held responsible for all the wrongs it has done and be made to help us climb out of the deep pit into which we have been pushed. This is an issue that needs debate. Islamabad meanwhile must also find ways to lay down the blueprint for a new kind of relationship with Washington. The money they pour in must not allow them to assume the role of masters. The equation must be a more equitable one. The challenge for Pakistan is to find a way to make this possible and set the necessary wheels in motion to drive towards this goal.

[jeypore]

On the other hand, when we take a realistic assessment of the grim situation we face, there must be some doubt as to whether we can cope with it on our own.

On the one hand US is needed and on the other:

Perhaps Washington should be held responsible for all the wrongs it has done and be made to help us climb out of the deep pit into which we have been pushed.

It is afterall not pushed but created by the illerate fundamental idelogy, isn't it!!!!

Blaming others instead of creating economic forces in the region is the culprit, one just need to see the history, Of misrepresentation in the gov't as well as economic development. Pakistan is not pushed, but created it's own problems which the world has to clean up.

[Neo]

U.S. Credibility and Pakistan

What Islamabad thinks of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Critics of the war in Afghanistan—inside and out of the Obama Administration—argue that we would be better off ensuring that nuclear-armed Pakistan will help us fight al Qaeda. As President Obama rethinks his Afghan strategy with his advisers in the coming days, he ought to listen to what the Pakistanis themselves think about that argument.

In an interview at the Journal's offices this week in New York, Pakistan Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi minced no words about the impact of a U.S. withdrawal before the Taliban is defeated. "This will be disastrous," he said. "You will lose credibility. . . . Who is going to trust you again?" As for Washington's latest public bout of ambivalence about the war, he added that "the fact that this is being debated—whether to stay or not stay—what sort of signal is that sending?"

Mr. Qureshi also sounded incredulous that the U.S. might walk away from a struggle in which it has already invested so much: "If you go in, why are you going out without getting the job done? Why did you send so many billion of dollars and lose so many lives? And why did we ally with you?" All fair questions, and all so far unanswered by the Obama Administration.

As for the consequences to Pakistan of an American withdrawal, the foreign minister noted that "we will be the immediate effectees of your policy." Among the effects he predicts are "more misery," "more suicide bombings," and a dramatic loss of confidence in the economy, presumably as investors fear that an emboldened Taliban, no longer pressed by coalition forces in Afghanistan, would soon turn its sights again on Islamabad.

Mr. Qureshi's arguments carry all the more weight now that Pakistan's army is waging an often bloody struggle to clear areas previously held by the Taliban and their allies. Pakistan has also furnished much of the crucial intelligence needed to kill top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in U.S. drone strikes. But that kind of cooperation will be harder to come by if the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan and Islamabad feels obliged to protect itself in the near term by striking deals with various jihadist groups, as it has in the past.

Pakistanis have long viewed the U.S. through the lens of a relationship that has oscillated between periods of close cooperation—as during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s—and periods of tension and even sanctions—as after Pakistan's test of a nuclear device in 1998. Pakistan's democratic government has taken major risks to increase its assistance to the U.S. against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Mr. Qureshi is warning, in so many words, that a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan would make it far more difficult for Pakistan to help against al Qaeda.

[Neo]

Pakistan welcomes US aid package

Saturday, 03 Oct, 2009

WASHINGTON: Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi on Friday welcomed a giant US aid package for his country, voicing hope that alleviating poverty would erode support for extremism.

Congress on Wednesday gave the final go-ahead for a five-year, 7.5-billion-dollar package to build schools, roads and democratic institutions in the country.

Qureshi, who is holding talks in Washington next week, voiced appreciation for the package, acknowledging that the United States was allocating the money despite a struggling economy at home.

'This is an expression of commitment to Pakistan and the people of Pakistan because better education, better health, improvement in physical infrastructure will help the people of Pakistan,' he told National Public Radio.

'The Taliban and the extremists have been extracting out of poverty and the misery of people in those areas. Obviously, when they're more enlightened and they're more educated, then they would not join them.'

Qureshi did not deny that many Pakistanis felt bitterness toward the United States, which worked with Pakistan to force the Soviets out of neighboring Afghanistan in the 1980s but then eased its involvement.

'You abandoned us,' he said.

President Barack Obama and congressional leaders say that the aid package is proof of a new US commitment to Pakistan and its people's needs.

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Limited options

Analysis by Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

The Pakistani government is not prepared to admit publicly that its precarious economic situation restricts its foreign policy options and increases its dependence on international financial institutions and the US

US-Pakistan relations have passed through many ups and downs. Alternating periods of cooperation and sanctions against Pakistan always evoked debate in both countries, reflecting varying degrees of distrust as well as convergence and divergence on bilateral, regional and global issues.

Given the sharp differences in the positions of the two countries in the global hierarchy, Pakistan’s political circles always found this relationship overwhelming. This perception became more conspicuous in the early 1980s when the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and many other states joined hands to build an Islamic-Afghan resistance to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

Since then, US policies towards Pakistan have had greater implications for Pakistan’s domestic context. There were Pakistani winners and losers from the American economic and military assistance and secret funding in the 1980s. In addition to General Zia-ul Haq’s military government, the major winners were Islamic groups and parties. The ISI and the CIA used American funds, material and weapons to strengthen Islamic orthodoxy and militancy to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. Even when the US left the region in 1990, Pakistan’s military continued to rely on orthodoxy and militancy to pursue its agenda in Afghanistan and it launched a new jihadi project in Indian-administered Kashmir.

The US’ Pakistan policies helped improve the political clout of the extreme right-orthodox religious elements, especially those advocating or pursuing jihad as an instrument of foreign policy and security agenda. This created a symbiotic relationship between Islamic militancy-jihad and the Pakistani state.

The reinvigoration of Pakistan-US relations after 9/11 had similar far reaching implications for Pakistan’s domestic politics.

Islamic parties and militant groups have been the major losers of the current Pakistan-US relations. Their privileged interaction with the Pakistani state suffered initially when the government and the military downgraded their relationship with Islamic and militant groups rather than severing it. However, the drift between the two increased over the years and by 2007, the Taliban and their associates openly turned against their one-time patron — the Pakistani state.

Pakistan’s decision in April 2009 to launch the Swat/Malakand military operation drew the battle lines. In addition to the Taliban and their associates, most Islamists and militants are opposed to Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policies which are described as an appendage to American policies.

The on-going debate in Pakistan on Pakistan-US relations is influenced more by domestic power politics rather than the realities of global politics and the options available to Pakistan against the backdrop of its troubled economy. Pakistani critics have chosen neither to pay any attention to the dynamics of global politics nor take into account the imperatives of promoting internal political cohesion in Pakistan and revitalising its economy.

The current domestic debate, at times emotionally charged, focuses on a number of issues including the physical and personnel expansion of the US embassy in Islamabad, renting of about two hundred houses in Islamabad by the American embassy, and the provisions of the “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009” (The Kerry-Lugar Act).

There are several unsubstantiated issues that are being raised by those opposed to reinvigorated Pakistan-US relations. These include allegations of the presence of an American security agency, Blackwater, and the arrival of several hundred marines, some of whom are engaged in military-like activities in the vicinity of Islamabad. These people also claim that a good number of American personnel enter Pakistan without visas and without the knowledge of the Pakistani government.

Islamic parties and militant groups are pursuing a massive propaganda campaign against the above issues. Their discourse, unsubstantiated by facts, reflects their self-created perceptions influenced by a narrow religious disposition. Most of them rely heavily on a host of conspiracy theories to explain how the US wants to destabilise and undermine Pakistan.

The Jama’at-e Islami, known as pro-West until 1990, spearheads the anti-US campaign and publicises the threat of the US taking over Islamabad or dismantling the nuclear programme by using a private security agencies and American marines that have been sneaked into Pakistan. Such disposition of Islamic and militant groups is not merely ideological but also reflects their fury on the loss of political clout in Pakistan’s domestic context due to Pakistan’s participation in the US-led global efforts to contain militancy, especially the recent military operations in Malakand/Swat and the tribal areas.

Some opposition is coming from the PMLN and others with strong rightist-nationalist orientations. The PMLN is pursuing a two-track policy. The top-most leaders like Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif do not publicly criticise current American counter-terrorism policies and support Pakistani security operations in Malakand and the tribal areas. However, the PMLN’s second line of leadership minces no words about Pakistan’s security operations, Pakistan-US relations and especially the Enhanced Partnership Act, which is being described as an insult to Pakistan. Their views overlap with those of the Jama’at-e Islami.

The current attack on the Enhanced Partnership Act is also part of the opposition effort to somehow knock out the PPP-led federal government, which is already facing a credibility crisis due to poor governance. If that is not possible, they want at least President Asif Ali Zardari forced out of office. The current controversies on Pakistan-US relations provide the opposition with a good opportunity to build additional pressure on the government.

The US government has to share the blame for the current anti-US campaign in Pakistan. Some American statements provide ample ammunition to the opposition in Pakistan. The occasional talk of drone attacks in Balochistan to wipe out the ‘Quetta shura’ of the Taliban gets a negative response even from those who actively support counter-terrorism.

The wording in the Enhanced Partnership Act regarding monitoring could have been done more carefully to take into account sensitivities in Pakistan’s political domain. For example, nuclear proliferation has been mentioned three times and the stipulation in section 203 (c)(1) “...to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks” can easily cause controversy if not read carefully.

The provision in section 302 (a) (15) regarding “...military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration” has caused alarm in political circles. Though the Act talks of monitoring only, this is being interpreted in Pakistan as a cover for interference, making it obligatory for Pakistan to seek US approval on these matters.

The government of Pakistan has allowed confusion to persist on the issues being raised by the political circles and the media. Its explanations are often vague and do not fully respond to the questions being raised.

The Pakistani government is not prepared to admit publicly that its precarious economic situation restricts its foreign policy options and increases its dependence on international financial institutions and the US. The government is unable to defend the new US assistance as an opportunity to revive the economy or to counter the criticism by Islamist and rightist-nationalist circles.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

[Neo]

Increasing assistance to Pakistan

EDITORIAL (October 02 2009): The United States Congress has approved legislation by Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) to triple non-military assistance to Pakistan during the next five years. Congressional approval is said to have come at an important moment for the Obama administration, as it wrestles with how to move forward in Afghanistan.

But while focussed on development, the legislation comes with strict conditions regarding security aid that were, according to the US media, the subject of intense negotiations with the White House and the Pentagon. Not included in the legislation is a provision that would have created economic opportunity zones in border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan from which goods could be imported to the US duty-free.

Republicans, who earlier had asserted that conditions in the House version of the bill amounted to micromanaging US support for Pakistan, eventually supported the legislation. Rightly so, the legislation (the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act) that "enjoys the strong support of Departments of State and Defence" seeks to extend unprecedented levels of civilian and military assistance to Pakistan on the one hand, and imposes strict monitoring protocol on the other, that has generated much controversy in the Pakistani media.

This protocol constitutes an enhancement of 10 million dollars for oversight/audit by US officials, to be led by Robin Raphael - from 20 million dollars to 30. Few in Pakistan would take exception to this clause given the corruption perception index in this country with respect to our governments - past as well as present.

What was the US Senate's objective in passing the bill? Senator Kerry advised his fellow Senators in the second quarter of 2009 that "we must approach this endeavour (Kerry-Lugar bill) with a large dose of humility. Our leverage is limited. This bill aims to increase that leverage significantly".

There is a consensus in Pakistan that US leverage on our governments, past as well as present, has been significant. The evidence of this is before all: the US and Nato admonishments followed by acknowledgement of efforts to combat global terrorism by the Pakistan government/armed forces, as well as the continuing drone attacks. The people of this country, however, are another matter.

What the people have taken strong exception to is the bill requirement of the US Secretary of State having to certify each year that Pakistan is fighting the war on terror - terror defined not only by the United States as fighting al Qaeda and the Taliban, which may have been acceptable to some extent to our political pundits - but allowing for input from India and Afghanistan.

While the government of Pakistan has rightly committed to the world polity that Pakistan would not be used as a base to launch terror attacks on its neighbouring countries or for that matter any country, yet, this condition does not take note of Indian and Afghan territory being used as a launch pad for terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil.

Given that terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil are greater in some months than in Afghanistan, even this component of the bill appears unreasonable at best downright anti-Pakistan at worst. According to Prime Minister Gilani, there is evidence linking India to continued insurgency in Balochistan and Afghanistan, to replenishing the arsenal as well as manpower of the Pakistani Taliban.

Once, when this issue was raised bilaterally, the Indian government was quick to request proof of this allegation. One would hope that the Minister of Interior focuses his attention on providing the proof of Indian and Afghan complicity in the terror attacks on our soil to the world polity as soon as possible instead of prioritising the elimination of the hundi system or signing security deals with foreign governments.

The bill is also being criticised in Pakistan for extending assistance to Pakistan on terms that the US considers best meet its foreign policy goals. This element of assistance has been always a factor in bilateral donor assistance. Between 2001 and 2004, total assistance to the developing countries rose continually, however much of it was due to the geo-strategic concerns of the donors, notably fighting terrorism.

According to several analysts, US assistance has taken on a militaristic angle, post 9/11, similar to the aid pattern during the cold war. In addition, increase in assistance in 2005 was largely due to the enormous debt relief granted to Iraq, Nigeria, and some other one-off large items. Thus, to argue that the conditions attached to US assistance are not in Pakistan's interests is hardly surprising or indeed unexpected.

However, if the recipient does not get anything in return, the assistance would not go through. It is, therefore, fairly evident that Pakistan will benefit to some extent, though not to the full extent of the assistance package, due to the fact that US aid would (i) oblige Pakistan to purchase uncompetitively-priced imports from the US, an example being that all US assistance to fight HIV/AIDS virus in Africa has the condition of importing anti-viral drugs from the US, with a price tag of up to 15,000 dollars a year compared to the 350 dollars annually for generics; and (ii) US consultants are much higher priced than local consultants - money which is automatically remitted back to the US.

Be that as it may Pakistan is in desperate need for assistance to meet its budget deficit targets as well as to support its balance of payment position. With no other country or international financial institution, apart from the International Monetary Fund, interested in investing the kind of money needed, Pakistan has no option but to swallow the bitter pill.

Or so the public has been informed. One would have hoped that a cash-strapped government would have shifted the continued reliance on generating assistance from abroad, a strategy that has not paid dividends a year and a half after the government took over power, to slashing expenditure and imports.

[Neo]

Qureshi urges US to build more trusting partnership

WASHINGTON (October 04 2009): Asserting Pakistan's political and military leadership's commitment to wipe out terrorism and a strong anti-militant public mood, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi has urged the United States to build a more trusting partnership with Pakistan. He argued firmly that Islamabad has nothing to gain by allowing Taliban's presence in Quetta and doing so would in no way help its case.

"We've been hearing about this for years now. Who all are the Quetta shura (governing council)? The names have been passed on to us. We did due diligence, and we have come to the conclusion that some of them have died, and some have left Pakistan," he told Los Angeles Times in an interview. "So, OK, if you have concern with the Quetta shura, talk about it. We are friends. We are allies. Let's not suspect each other. Let's trust each other," the Foreign Minister said.

The two allies, he said, have developed trust to a great extent over the last year but need to build further on it. "The question is: Why are you doubting us, when we're willing to work with you? Do you think we want a presence of Taliban in Quetta? What do we gain out of that? We are not helping our case by doing that.

"We need to build more trust. I think in the last year or so, we have successfully built that trust to a great extent. Today, there is more confidence in the American political and military leadership, vis-a-vis the political and military leadership of Pakistan. But we need to get more." Asked about Pakistan's intelligence organisation's anti-Taliban commitment, Qureshi emphasised that the top military and ISI leaders are working in agreement with the political leadership.

"Today you have two gentlemen in office (Army General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and ISI chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha) who understand and have a good control of the ISI. And they are in agreement with what the political leadership is doing. "So, make up your minds if you want ISI as a foe or a friend. If you want the ISI to be a friend, then stop beating them all the time. Acknowledge the positive that they've done. Obviously, there's room for improvement, and we are willing to hear suggestions.

"But the military leadership of the ISI? You couldn't have asked for better people than what you have now. "You have a great window of opportunity. You have today in the military leadership the right people. You have the right people at the political leadership. We have converted (our) public opinion (against the Taliban). This is the right time to move forward. We are ready. Are you?" he said, according to a transcript put on the newspapers Internet edition.

In answer to another question, the Foreign Minister said: "Pakistan is willing to go into Waziristan and will itself decide the timing for the move. "Because we understand the country. We understand the local situation. Let the military leadership of Pakistan decide the pace and the timing. We are one with you on the objectives. You should know what we are doing and why we are doing this." "Resources! As simple as that," he replied when asked about Pakistan's logic.

"We cannot stretch ourselves thin. We learned from your experience. What have you done in the south [of Afghanistan]? The US has moved into those provinces, and cleared (the Taliban) out. And once they left, (the Taliban) came again. Our strategy today is more effective because after clearing out the Swat Valley, we have decided to stay there. We decided to have a continuing military presence until we have enough civilian structures to ensure law and order there. And we already have moved into the tribal belt. We can continue to move on."

[Neo]

Pakistan and US aid

By Shahid Javed Burki
Tuesday, 06 Oct, 2009

Directly or indirectly the United States has been involved in helping Pakistan develop its economy. It is good to acquaint ourselves with the history of this involvement in order to prepare for what is likely to come.

The strategy of growth adopted by Pakistan in the early days of independence was a reaction to some of the measures adopted by India in dealing with its new neighbour. One element of this strategy was that it forced the country to industrialise quickly by seeking to become self-sufficient in the production of basic manufactured goods.

But the strategy needed finance of which Pakistan had very little. It turned to America for help, first indirectly and then much more directly. A deep relationship of mutual dependence was to develop between the two countries. This relationship was underlined by four wars — the Korean War, the Cold War, the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the war against terrorism. Pakistan played a role in each one of these which meant that America’s relations with the Pakistani military became an important part of the dealing between the two countries.

According to a newspaper account, ‘a searing report by the US Government Accountability Office last year said that the Bush administration had relied too heavily on the Pakistani military to achieve its counterterrorism goals, and had paid too little attention to economic assistance’.

The US Congress has passed an act for aid to Pakistan that will triple the amount of economic assistance the latter has received in the last few years. Large sums were provided since 9/11 to the government headed by President Pervez Musharraf. Most of the $11bn worth of aid went to the military as compensation for the help it was giving to the Americans in their operations in Afghanistan. Some assistance was also provided for building the country’s capacity to undertake counterinsurgency measures. This was something relatively new for the defence forces in Pakistan since their preoccupation up until now was to protect the country’s borders against possible attacks by India.

This time around, the US is committing itself to helping Pakistan to improve the lives of its citizens. This is being done as a part of the belief that unhappy people are potential insurgents and there are many of those in Pakistan. In this context Washington has come to two correct conclusions.

One, the country with some 170 million people subscribing to the Islamic faith and located in the world’s most sensitive area is too important to be left to its own devices.

Two, given the previous involvement of the United States in Pakistan when Washington abandoned Islamabad suddenly because its own purpose had been fulfilled, there is a suspicion in Pakistan that this time as well the engagement will be there for as long as Afghanistan needs attention. Once the US chooses to downsize its presence in that country for whatever reason, interest in Pakistan will also be lost.

To convince the Pakistani citizenry that this will not happen the Americans are willing to commit themselves for a longer period of time.

The US is now keen to draw a sharp distinction between economic and military aid.

It is the former that concerns me today. According to newspaper reports, the United States has several concerns as it rebuilds its economic presence in Pakistan. It wants to ensure that there will be not a great amount of leakage from the money likely to flow to Islamabad. There are two types of leakages and both give foreign aid a bad name. The first is the amount of money that stays behind in the country that provides assistance.

This is not a new concern. The extent of money that never goes to the recipients can be large. Some estimates were made decades ago by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the basis of a methodology developed to estimate what was called ‘tied aid’. Having concluded that the proportions can be large, the OECD went on to develop rules that bilateral donors were expected to follow.

In spite of these rules, the proportion remains large. In an interview given to The New York Times, Shaukat Tarin, Pakistan’s finance minister, said that ‘foreign contractors absorbed up to 45 per cent of the assistance in the past years’. The proportion can be much larger if aid has a provision that only the goods manufactured or commodities produced by the aid giver can be procured by the recipient.

The other leakage occurs through corruption in the recipient countries. According to the above cited newspaper report, ‘Obama administration officials are debating how much of the assistance should go directly to a government that has been widely accused of corruption’. However, bypassing the government and giving aid directly to non-government organisations may appear to be attractive over the short-term but would be very counterproductive over the long-term. What the United States should be turning its attention to right away is to build the institutions of government rather than ignore them.

This poses an important question. How should the government be strengthened? For an answer we may look to Pakistan’s own history. In the 1960s when a great amount of money was to be spent on building ‘replacement works’ under the Indus Water Treaty President Ayub Khan had signed with Jawaharlal Nehru the Indian prime minister, the government in Pakistan turned to the Water and Power Development Authority to implement the projects.

Wapda did an extraordinary amount of high quality work over a constrained period of time. It was able to recruit the best talent available in the country, reward it well but hold it to high accountability standards. In business school literature Wapda-type organisations are called ‘special purpose vehicles’ which governments set up in order to implement special programmes and projects. This is precisely the route the US should follow in developing some of the sectors on which it should concentrate.

[Neo]

‘US military hardware not reserved for Pakistan’

Friday, 09 Oct, 2009

WASHINGTON: US military hardware is not reserved for Pakistan and can be given to other countries in South Asia as well, warns a powerful American lawmaker Gary Ackerman.

Ackerman, who heads the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, was riled by Pakistan’s reaction to the Kerry-Lugar bill, calling it an indication that the Pakistanis did not want friendship with the United States.

‘If Pakistan doesn’t want us as a partner, that’s up to them,’ said Ackerman in a statement distributed by his office. 'But should they take such a decision, they should do so knowing full well that our military assistance, advanced technology and intelligence cooperation are not gifts, but the specific consequences of our cooperation.

‘They should likewise, be aware that these things are not reserved for them and that American interests in South Asia are not limited to just Pakistan. We don’t sell F-16s and Harpoon missiles to just anyone.’

Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations on Wednesday, Foreign Minister Mehmood Shah Qureshi tried to portray a widespread Pakistani perspective before an audience of US scholars and policy-makers.

He said that Pakistan’s current predicament was shaped by past cooperation with the US in the covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Pakistan ended up sheltering millions of Afghan refugees and still had three million Afghan refugees, Qureshi said.

It also has suffered blowback in the form of a growing internal jihadi threat. And Pakistanis perceive that they were abandoned by the US after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Qureshi said.

But so far no effort has been made, either by the Pakistani embassy or visiting Pakistani officials, to explain the Pakistani reaction to the Americans.

Instead, embassy officials spend most of their time warning Pakistanis that if they continued this ‘unreasonable and illogical’ attitude ‘they may end up losing America’s friendship.’

In the absence of a proper explanation, most US officials and lawmakers continued to be perplexed by the Pakistani reaction to a bill they see as a ‘great friendly gesture from the US for Pakistan and its people,’ as Senator John Kerry, one of the co-sponsors of the bill said.

‘Shell-shocked,’ said a senior member of Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s delegation that held talks with US officials in Washington this week when asked to describe the US response to the Pakistani reaction.