Zardari - a skilled politician or an amateur?
Part - II
ARTICLE (June 07 2010): In the past, the army initiated action against an elected government and it was the judiciary that provided it with legal cover and thereby legitimised its continuation. The fact that the two institutions were generally regarded as two sides of the coin that had the face of dictatorship firmly stamped on it is not in dispute.
What is in dispute is the nature of the current scenario: it appears that the judiciary is playing a lead role in undermining the leadership of the Pakistan People's Party and the army to date has ostensibly remained unmoved by the tussle; or at least no statement to the contrary has been made public.
The question then is if Zardari is playing his cards astutely by unleashing his loyalists attacking the judiciary as well as the media or has he displayed the hallmarks of an amateur politician? The third pillar of state, the judiciary, is the only institution, and one has to include the opposition in this, that appears to be proactively challenging the powers/decisions of the President and the Prime Minister. Can the judiciary terminate a sitting democratically elected President for past indiscretions? Zardari haters hope so.
Zardari haters but democracy lovers, read liberals, emphasise that the Parliament must unseat him rather than the courts. Zardari-lovers argue that the courts are targeting the President, thereby reflecting a bias, and maintain that the President, to borrow the phrase of the Duchess of York selling access to her former husband, is whiter than white.
The rationale presented by Zardari loyalist, Kaira: Cotecna and SGS were absolved from giving bribes to Pakistan's former First Couple and the case against them dismissed in the Swiss courts on 'merit', therefore, the 60 million dollars, alleged to be kickbacks from these two Swiss organisations, is also without merit. The claimants for the 60 million dollars, he argues, are some 50 odd organisations and not just the former First Couple.
However, what is critical is that the government has so far not taken on the courts at all. Babar Awan, for all his muscle flexing outside the courts as well as in the Senate, was respectful in the court. He made some statements that many argue can easily be challenged. Awan stated in the court that he had documents that would prove that the President was not involved in the 60 million-dollar Swiss account scam, money which has since disappeared according to sources.
While one must wait for the next court hearing to know progress on this, one critical question remains: if the Supreme Court rules against the government on any issue, then how will it enforce its decisions? That's where we enter the grey area because the implementer of the court decisions is the executive as it has to issue orders to the law-enforcement agencies to do the needful.
The executive's response so far has been to rhetorically assert that they respect the court's decision but not to follow these decisions in letter or spirit by using the powers that it has to override these decisions. An example is the President's power to pardon that was used to pardon Rehman Malik. Or to claim immunity for the President as is provided by the Constitution.
The army has been used in the past to enforce the court's decision. Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and Chief of Army Staff Kayani are unlikely to take the country to a stage where the army is requested to come in aid of the judiciary, or such is the consensus.
The reason, the analysts maintain, is contained in the history and personality of these two men - the CJ's historical struggle for democracy and General Kayani - though it is well known was not engaged in the struggle for democracy - is certainly credited with sustaining it as he is held responsible for ensuring that the army did not come in aid of Musharraf when he was forced to resign. In addition, Kayani is also considered to be the man, who calmed turbulent waters during Nawaz Sharif's long march to reinstate the judiciary when the Zardari government had so obviously misjudged the situation.
President Zardari continues to play the personality card. This does not imply that he has made any astute analysis of the character of those he considers his protagonists, and one has to include COAS Kayani, CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry and Nawaz in that list, but he continues to blatantly cajole and threaten, deliberately negotiate a deal and break it, manifestly give in on one issue and take away from another. This is precisely the way politics in Pakistan was played in the past: deal with protagonists by not giving them any comfort level for long, an approach that may well have partly accounted for Pakistan's brief forays into democracy and sustained lament of political victimisation.
However, what is evident to all is that given the existing lawlessness in the country today, and the attack on Ahmadi worship places in Lahore bears testimony to this assertion, and the rising poverty levels due to flawed economic policies of the government, including failure to invest adequate amount in energy sector, two years running leading to national productivity being much lower than potential, there is an urgent need for all the protagonists to work together. One would hope that the PPP does not point to its policy of political reconciliation, as reflected by its coalition with the ANP and the MQM, as proof that it is following just such a policy. But instead extends a hand of reconciliation towards those protagonists, who it sees as a threat to Zardari rule.
It is also essential for the Zardari protagonists to seek to defuse mistrust for that is the need of the hour. Nawaz, the man who is considered would benefit the most with the end of the present government, must allow his party to play its role as an opposition, which must entail not only coming up with viable alternatives, or in other words, providing an alternate budget instead of merely critiquing the one presented by the government, and fulfil his promise to campaign in all parts of the country.
Zardari, however, continues to ignore one overwhelmingly apparent fact: the world in 2010 is no longer what it was in the 1990s and Pakistan is no longer what it was when the PPP ruled this country last. This essentially implies that going into self-imposed exile for allegations of corruption (or on charges of commission or omission) may not be an option in the future and that a determined successor to his official office can revitalise all past charges. The extradition of Hamesh Khan surely is proof of that.
President Zardari must think long term and deal with all these issues while he is in a position of strength as the President of this country and the undisputed Co-Chairman of Pakistan's largest party, (like his appointed Prime Minister did by getting all cases against him squared off by the Dogar court). Thus there is little doubt that there is a need to look at the transcripts of the Swiss courts, as well as the information contained in the 12 boxes recovered from Wajid Shamsul Hassan by the National Accountability Bureau and then lay this case to rest once and for all. This would not only be in the interest of the court but also of the main accused.
The President must also understand that past carefully selected COAS by the head of government/state did not thwart subsequent coups. And his selection of a future CJ or indeed members of the superior judiciary or lower courts may also not provide him with a comfort level for all times to come. It is for these reasons that he must learn to deal with institutions and not with individuals.
(Concluded)
Business Recorder [Pakistan's First Financial Daily]
Zardari - a skilled politician or an amateur?
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