Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood Interview on Pakistan's nuclear program

[mean_bird]

Exclusive Interview of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (ex- Director-General, Nuclear Power, PAEC/ Project-Director Kahuta enrichment project and Khushab reactor project): Waqt News TV, July, 23, 2009, Islamabad.

Sabir Shakir: Viewers, in today’s special segment of Waqt News, we have with us renowned nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, who made a significant contribution to Pakistan’s nuclear program during his professional career. Today we shall discuss what he knows about the various phases of Pakistan’s nuclear program and whether Pakistan’s nuclear program is the creation of a single individual, and what has been the role of different personalities in the nuclear program.

SS: Sultan sahib, please tell us that the long journey of Pakistan’s nuclear program which comprised various phases, but the impression we get is that this program was created and developed due to one single individual and it was because of that person’s efforts that Pakistan became a nuclear power. What would you like to say about this?

SBM: Like you yourself mentioned, Pakistan’s nuclear program has been there for a very long time, during which thousands of people participated in this program, and the nuclear program consists of many different parts. This nuclear program began in 1956, its first Chairman was Dr. Nazir Ahmad, then came Dr. I.H. Usmani, and the 1960s era was of manpower development. At that time, Pakistan lacked nuclear scientists and nuclear engineers. I. H. Usmani’s very big achievement is that he selected brilliant students from universities in Pakistan, and sent them to the best universities in the west from where they learnt the different aspects of nuclear technology. So we can term the decade of the 1960s as a decade manpower development. During this time, PINSTECH was also set up and our main research centre was Atomic Energy Mineral Centre, Lahore, and during this time, the exploration and mining of uranium was also started. In 1967, I was in the Lahore Centre, and I had just returned from the UK after completing M.Sc nuclear engineering. In the Lahore Centre, one of our senior physicists was Dr. Naeem Ahmad Khan, who was head of Lahore Centre’s Physics Department. He formed an informal research group on uranium enrichment at the Lahore Centre and the interesting thing about this group is that the three to four individuals in that group, they played very important roles in the nuclear programme of Pakistan. This group included, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, who is very well known; there was Mr. Hafeez Qureshi, who was head of the Wah Group that made and perfected Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; there was Bashiruddin Mahmood, who is in front of you, and I did what God desired me to do for Pakistan, but this group could not continue for long. So the nuclear programme continued throughout the 1960s till 1970.

SS: In the 1960s, Munir Ahmad Khan, who was at the IAEA, contacted Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and asked him to talk to President Ayub Khan or the Government of Pakistan to take an initiative towards the development of nuclear weapons, so what was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s reply to him?

SBM: Munir Ahmad Khan told me this episode as well, and he also mentioned this at a Ravian’s function. Mr. Munir Khan met President Ayub Khan on the advice of Mr. Bhutto and told the President that we should start work on a nuclear weapons program because India had already begun its weapons program at the Bhabha Atomic Centre. He also told him that the essential elements needed for a nuclear weapons program, such as a reprocessing plant, India has already obtained from the UK, which was working. Then a nuclear reactor which is needed to produce plutonium, CIRUS, had been provided by Canada and is working at Trombay; heavy water plant was provided by USA to India and all this had been set up by India before 1962. And these three facilities can be used to make a plutonium based nuclear bomb and Munir Ahmad Khan told Mr. Bhutto and President Ayub Khan that India will definitely use these plants to make a bomb and Pakistan’s nuclear program is far behind India at this time. He also asked Mr. Bhutto to talk to President Ayub Khan about all this. President Ayub Khan told Munir Ahmad Khan that if we ever need the bomb, we will get it from some friendly country like USA or China.

SS: So can we say that President Ayub Khan did not prove to be far-sighted or showed cowardice?

SBM: I think I will not call it cowardice, and those days it was not a question of bravery or cowardice, but I would say he was not far-sighted. Another example of this lack of far-sightedness is that when the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) was being negotiated, Canada was ready to provide Pakistan with additional facilities like a fuel fabrication plant for some additional money, but the then Minister of Finance, Shoaib, said that why should we give any additional money to the Canadians. The Chairman of PAEC strongly emphasized that if these facilities are available for only a few million dollars.

SS: Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also said at that time that President Ayub Khan is not agreeing for now, and when a good time will come, we will begin this work (on nuclear weapons) ourselves.

SBM: Yes Munir Ahmad Khan told me this thing that Mr. Bhutto said ," Munir, Inshallah our time will also come.”

SS So did Mr. Bhutto know that in the future he would come in politics in the way he did?

SBM: Bhutto was a visionary leader, so sometimes they say such things which later prove to be prophetic. And when Mr. Bhutto called a conference on January, 20, 1972 at Multan, it was attended by all the prominent scientists of Pakistan. I was a very junior person at that time, I was at the position of senior engineer, but somehow I reached Multan. I had sent a telegram to Mr. Bhutto that you have invited great names, but you should also invite some one from the younger lot and I am the secretary of the Association of Engineers at PINSTECH, so I should also be allowed to attend the Conference. Therefore, Mr. Bhutto directed the PAEC that I should also be allowed to attend the Conference, so I reached there. Many speeches were made at the Multan Conference, and I also wanted to say something. I was sitting far behind with the journalists, so I would raise my hand after each speech, like a schoolboy. So Mr. Bhutto saw me and said, “ That young man!” So I managed to reach the stage, and told Mr. Bhutto that,” My appeal to you is that you should announce that Pakistan will make a bomb and our survival lies in making a bomb.” Later Mr. Bhutto quickly concluded the Conference, and he again repeated his famous quote that ,” We have a thousand year war with India and we will make the atomic bomb even if we have to eat grass,” this triggered a lot of enthusiasm amongst the audience and there was a lot of clapping and jubilation. Then Bhutto said, “how many years will you take, ” some said five years, some three, and there was an uproar in the Conference. Then Mr. Bhutto himself got up and said “five years,” and with this Mr. Bhutto made some major changes in the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and appointed Munir Ahmad Khan as its new Chairman.

SS:So were those targets achieved in five years?

SBM: This program was formally begun in 1974 and I was involved in it right from the beginning. According to our feasibility reports, we planned to achieve our targets by the end of 1979.

SS: You said that our nuclear program had begun in some form since the 1950s, and manpower was being developed, and there was also talk of enriching uranium, so when did Dr. AQ Khan join this journey?

SBM: When Mr. Bhutto announced his decision in 1972, it became Munir Ahmad Khan’s job to make Pakistan a nuclear weapon state. Then India conducted a nuclear test on May 18, 1974, and termed it Smiling Buddha. India equated a person like Buddha with the atomic bomb. Smiling Buddha was a shock for all of us. I was working at that time in KANUPP, and it will be no exaggeration to state that I and others wept over this event. It was an emotional state that India had done it and we had yet to do it. I wrote to Munir Ahmad Khan and referred the Multan Conference to him. At that time, the weapons program was not being developed openly, it was a very secret program, and was being implemented at the level of Munir Ahmad Khan, but we engineers were not privy to that program. Then in November, 1974, I got a sudden order to come to Islamabad, and came to Munir Khan’s office in the evening after 7. pm. It was a surprise for me when KANUPP’s Project-Director told me that the PAEC Chairman has asked you to meet him this evening. When I went to see Munir Ahmad Khan in the evening after 7 pm, he told me that,” We want to give you a very important assignment, but you promise with me that you will not talk about it even to your wife, this is a secret between you and me.” I said it is my promise that it will remain a secret. Then he said that I will brief you in detail later and asked me to see him tomorrow evening with a review paper on uranium enrichment technology. So I went back to see him with a review paper, which included centrifuge technology, diffusion technology, laser technology and Becker-nozzle technology were highlighted. He saw the paper and asked me to see him again the next day. When I saw him the next day, he said, that “We have taken a decision to begin an enrichment program, and now we have to decide which process should be adopted. You also study, and we are also carrying out studies in this regard.” Some days later, Munir Ahmad Khan gave me a letter, which was a handwritten letter addressed to Mr. Bhutto from someone called Abdul Karim, which was a cover name for Abdul Qadeer Khan. He wrote in his letter that he was working with the Almelo plant, which was part of the joint Dutch-German and British consortium (URENCO) to produce enriched uranium, and Italy was also working on enrichment those days. He wrote that “I am associated with this project and can help you if you have any such program.”

SS: Dr. AQ Khan wrote this letter to Mr. Bhutto?

SBM: Yes, AQ Khan wrote this letter to Mr. Bhutto who gave it to Munir Ahmad Khan, who kept the letter with him after I had read it. Munir Ahmad Khan asked me to go to Holland but told me to first go to Belgium where Mr. SA Butt is in charge of our procurements. He asked me” to tell SA Butt to call this person (AQ Khan) and you discuss things with him.” I asked SA Butt this is the number to contact this person and I will reach Belgium on this date and we will stay at your place. So we went there and stayed at SA Butt’s house where AQ Khan also came. We talked for the whole night and stayed there for the next day as well. Then he invited me to go to Amsterdam with him, and I went to Amsterdam with him, and stayed at his home for one night and we talked about different aspects. When I returned, I told Munir Ahmad Khan that AQ Khan will be useful and helpful for our program. At that time, we were engaged in the process of manpower development for the enrichment project.

SS: So can we say that you conducted Dr. AQ Khan’s first interview?

SBM: Yes you can say that and he was recommended by me to Munir sahib after meeting him. But at that time, it was our job to construct a working team from within and outside Pakistan. We told AQ Khan that you will stay in Holland and need not come to Pakistan and asked him to send us whatever material or information. Likewise, we had made similar arrangements for information elsewhere also. So this is the way we had an introduction with Dr. AQ Khan. So then he started sending us useful information from time to time. The United States had declassified a lot of information which was available at the IAEA headquarters’ library in Vienna and in other open technical literature. I stated at Vienna for some time, and I brought relevant material with me. We also got similar useful information from other countries also.

SS:What other countries did we tap for help in nuclear technology?

SBM:It will not be appropriate for me to name any such country, but we had a broad-based program. In those days, there were little or no restrictions and a lot of material was easily available. We needed to have contacts and Munir Ahmad Khan had a lot of contacts at several places by being at the IAEA and on the basis of these contacts, I could go and reach to different people.

SS:You have taken big names in the nuclear program, but some unnamed soldiers were also part of this effort.

SBM: Yes we talk big things and take big names. The basic strength is in Pakistan’s workers and technicians. When we started the enrichment project, I personally visited 300 Pakistani industries to see how many people are employed there and what are their skills and capabilities and what kind of machinery and equipment is installed there. Later on, towards the end of 1976, a 1400 page directory of who is who in industry was published. In the beginning of 1976, we were developing a high-speed electric motor to run at 60,000 rpm. Dr. AQ Khan had arrived by the beginning of 1976. We found out that a copper store was located somewhere in Lahore, where a famous skilled worker Bashir Ahmad worked. We had the technology and the designs with us, but we needed a skillful worker who could implement these ideas into a practical shape. So went to see him and held a discussion with him, who then asked for two or three days to produce results. Before those 3 days, ended, he called us that I have made one sample and please come and see it for yourself. So I took Dr. AQ Khan with me and we both went to see his work. Bashir Ahmad had done quite a good job. Now the centrifuge rests on a base which is made from aluminium, and it has the same vacuum as on the moon. We could cast the base again and again and casting is a difficult technology, and aluminium technology is particularly difficult. So we were looking for an expert and highly skilled worker. Engineers and metallurgists can only tell the theory. So in Gujranwala, there was a young worker said that he will try to cast the base of the centrifuge. So we went back after 3 to 4 days along with our test equipment like high-vacuum measuring devices. When we tested his sample, his base passed our standards and requirements and Dr. AQ Khan asked him how he had done it, because he was also a metallurgist and his interest was more. The worker told him that aluminium has a flow when it melts, but copper has a better flow, so I have added copper, aluminium and some other materials and increased the flow of the materials and the process and rate of cooling it after heating and melting is also very important. He said that this is how he had done it. So when we were building the nuclear reactor at Khushab, we took a lot of advantage from these experiences. We had realized that there are several very intelligent and skilled people in Pakistan, who are working in workshops, but people do not reach these skilled workers and do not take advantage of their skills. You will be happy to know that a country has produced a nuclear reactor at Khushab where 82 percent local component was used, when it was said that this country could not produce a proper fan or a bicycle, and this reactor is running trouble free for the last twelve years, and such skilled workers have their contribution in making this reactor.

SS:Talking of Khushab, can we also produce any tactical weapons?

SBM: Khushab was our next goal after Kahuta. The Khushab project was initiated by the late Munir Ahmad Khan in 1986. Formal construction work began in 1987. We completed this reactor and started it in 1997. The purpose was to make a plutonium production reactor which could also produce tritium gas. So Khushab has the capability to make all these materials. In addition, it is also an experimental reactor. So after Khushab, by the Grace of God, Pakistan has every capability that nuclear technology can offer.

SS: Such a big team worked, which together achieved nuclear capability, so why is this impression prevalent that only Dr.AQ Khan was the hero of this journey?

SBM: This impression has been deliberately created. No one in any other country called anyone a hero. It is always a huge team work, and if we talk of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, so Dr. Samar Mubarakmand has clearly told in his lectures that 20-21 different technologies and plants contribute to the making of the bomb, and I second him. In fact, there are many more activities, which were all independent activities, and each activity had its own Project-Director, and these projects were being supervised and coordinated by Munir Ahmad Khan. Of these 20-21 activities, one was enrichment, which is very important, but these 21 activities are like the end logic of a computer, and if even one is not present, our job could not have been accomplished. Each one of these two dozen technologies and projects were equally important in their own right.

SS: So all these activities, components and projects were equally important in their own way?

SBM: No doubt, they were very important and if they would not have been there, then the task could not have been completed and Pakistan could not become a nuclear power. Moreover, barring enrichment project, all other projects and activities were always under the PAEC. The enrichment project was also launched by the PAEC and I left that project in July, 1976.

SS So you were asked to hand over the keys of the enrichment project?

SBM: I was working there on some machine, and someone told me that Munir Ahmad Khan, Agha Shahi and AQ Khan were sitting in my room who were asking for me. Agha Shahi was sitting in my seat and Munir Ahmad Khan was sitting in front. Agha Shahi told me to hand over the charge and the keys to AQ Khan. I looked at Munir Ahmad Khan as it was a very abrupt situation. He said yes. I said ok.

SS: So what led to your removal from the project? Were you accused of being Qadiani and what is the truth in this allegation?

SBM: First of all there is no truth in this. I was accused of being Mizai. Neither I, nor any one in my family is mirzai or Qadiani. By the Grace of Allah, I am Muslim, and believe in the finality of the Prophet-hood of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and who ever accused me, I declare him a liar. Every year, a security analysis was connected for everyone in PAEC. When I was appointed head of the Kahuta enrichment project, a lot of scrutiny was conducted. When such false allegations were leveled, there were religious and political disturbances in the country, and some people, due to personal ambitions or reasons, or due to some conspiracy, accused me being Qadiani because they were non-Muslims under the 1974 law passed by the Parliament, and therefore could not hold any sensitive position in government. Such people not only accused me, but also Dr. Riazuddin, one of the most respected scientists of Pakistan, who was Member (Technical), PAEC, at that time, and he carried out theoretical calculations of the bomb project and Munir Ahmad Khan was also accused of the same. I was also accused of procuring some material which was not required. It was said that I had procured maraging steel worth millions, which is a very important material and it was alleged that I had procured ordinary steel and not maraging steel. I had procured maraging steel in large quantities because we knew that these materials would not be easily available later on, and time proved that this was the right thing to do. So our strategy was to procure all essential materials and machines for the enrichment project in the first one or two years, and if today this project is running, it is due to the farsightedness of this strategy.

SS: So why did you leave PAEC due to differences over signing CTBT?

SBM: The implications for signing CTBT were equal to freezing Pakistan’s nuclear programme. CTBT is a test ban treaty and unless one tests, perfection cannot be achieved. But Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad and Dr. AQ Khan said that even if Pakistan signs CTBT, our nuclear development will continue. But my view was entirely different. So I wrote to the three service chiefs against signing CTBT. I also gave a talk at the National Defence College against signing CTBT and displeasure was shown on this. Although as a government servant, one should not have done so, but here it was a matter of principle, and not a matter of job and I decided to stand for my principles.

SS: So you think the same about CTBT today also?

SBM: Yes we should never sign CTBT. Our program is a dynamic program. It is in our national interest to carry our program forward. The US has still not ratified the CTBT, India and Israel have also not signed, so why should Pakistan sign it?

SS: Should Pakistan sign FMCT?

SBM: Not at all. We are a sovereign state. We have our own program and requirements. But we must never indulge in proliferation. Nuclear technology should not be shared with any other country, especially weapons technology. But cooperation in agriculture, electricity generation, medicine and radio-isotopes is alright.

SS:You were against signing CTBT, but why were Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad and Dr. AQ Khan in favour of signing it?

SBM: I don’t know but this was in the media those days that they were in favour of it.

SS: Should Pakistan carry out more nuclear tests and what kind of tests can they be?

SBM: If the scientists feel the need to test, they should test. Pakistan should develop tactical weapons, which are relatively clean and do not disperse radioactivity on a large scale, and destroy only a limited and targeted area. Their development is more useful in warfare.

SS: Can Pakistan develop tactical weapons?

SBM: I am certain that Pakistan should have such a capability. But I am not in touch with atomic energy in any way since my retirement.

SS: Can Pakistan also make nuclear submarines?

SBM: After making Khushab and mastering other technologies, this task is not difficult for Pakistan.

SS: Should Pakistan install more nuclear power reactors?

SBM: Yes certainly. In fact, the present energy crisis would not have taken place if the previous governments had taken the advice of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission seriously and implemented it accordingly. PAEC has always advised for a mix energy pattern and it was envisaged that by the year 2000, at least 5000 MW would be nuclear energy.

SS: Is Pakistan’s nuclear program safe?

SBM:If Pakistan has a strong military, judiciary and democratic institutions, then no one can harm Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan Army is the protector of Pakistan and its ideology and its nuclear program. Pakistan will, God willing, remain forever.