Safe and sound -- Pakistan's nukes

[Ahmed Ali Shah]

Few days ago an article appeared praising Pakistan's nuclear security against the outsider threat. However, same article asserted that inside threat to Pakistan's nuclear weapons can be real threat.

Following is the response to the article by Brig (R) Naeem Salik, former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA) at the Strategic Plans Division (SPD).

Safe and sound -- Pakistan's nukes
Friday, June 12, 2009
This is in reference to your editorial of June 8 titled "Safe and sound". While I am appreciative of the broader position taken by you on the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, on which there must be no doubt, western propaganda notwithstanding; there are at least two aspects that need to be seen in the correct perspective.

Firstly, while your assertion that Pakistan has invested heavily in the security of its facilities and weapons is absolutely valid, your interpretation that the warheads are 'stored in a disassembled state in more than one location. No warhead is attached to a delivery system. No delivery system is located in the same facility as the warhead parts' is basically speculative, conjectural and conveys a state of operational unpreparedness, which would be a very dangerous situation and seriously erode the credibility of our nuclear deterrence. I have never seen any official statement, and I emphasise on 'any' official statement, depicting the status that you describe in your editorial. The best description that one comes across is the position that our weapons are not on hair trigger, contrary to the Cold War times regarding the American and Soviet nuclear weapons. Now, not being on hair trigger, does not imply scattered and disassembled weapons. Somehow the latter perception seems to have caught the imagination, and needs to be corrected. Any military would want to strike a balance between operational readiness and preventing accidental or unauthorised use.

Secondly, I agree with your concern that there can be individuals in our society who may tend to think of an agenda to find links with people within Pakistan's strategic organisations to gain nuclear knowledge, thereby creating an 'insider threat'. This must, however, be seen in consideration of Pakistan's proactive response to such possibilities. Nuclear security is a multi-dimensional and robust mechanism that covers all aspects of security, including physical security tiers, intelligence systems, counter-intelligence set-ups, technical solutions to security and more importantly the so-called Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) that amply covers the human factor risk. All individuals within the nuclear establishment are subjected to the PRP, which commences from background checks, police records, medical records, etc and goes on to include security screening, periodic, as well as random security clearances, closely monitored access controls, two-person rule, sensitive material accounting, etc. The list is long and stringent. While one is never complacent about security systems and one must never be- we should rest assured that any potential tendency of a possible 'insider threat' would be identified at the outset and would be nipped in the bud. Finally, much seems to have been made of the so-called US assistance in this area. To the best of my information, it has been extremely modest, focused on very elementary training and mostly inconsequential -- and most certainly non-intrusive. All of the security solutions in place are home-grown and entirely indigenous.

Brigadier (r) Naeem Ahmed Salik

Islamabad
http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=182527