Kabul attack

[Neo]

Kabul attack

Dawn Editorial
Wednesday, 20 Jan, 2010

An Afghan policeman stands in front of the shopping mall, where Taliban gunmen battled security forces for hours, as the government forces restored control after the attack in Kabul, which saw suicide bombers blowing themselves up at several locations and heavily armed militants fighting a pitched battle in a shopping centre.

The audacious suicide-cum-fidayeen attack on the doorstep of the Afghan presidential palace is an ominous development. There was, of course, death and destruction but the real impact of Monday’s attack in Kabul was symbolic: the militants are sending notice that they can strike at will anywhere in Afghanistan, even yards from where President Karzai is swearing in ministers in his new cabinet.

Suspicion has quickly fallen on the Haqqani network, and it seems likely the group is behind the latest attack. That the Haqqani network appears to be growing in strength does not surprise seasoned observers. Three advantages combine to make the Haqqani network uniquely powerful in Afghanistan.

First, the Haqqani brand isn’t built simply on legendary exploits on the battlefield — the Haqqanis are also considered spiritual leaders because of the chain of madressahs they have built over the decades, especially in the Waziristan agencies. Second, Al Qaeda has concentrated its activities in the east of Afghanistan, which is where the Haqqani strongholds are located. The resulting Al Qaeda-Haqqani nexus has given the Haqqani network a big boost. Third, the Haqqani network’s linkages with the Pakistani Taliban have given it a rear base in Pakistan’s tribal areas and added to its strength. To those advantages add the fact that the torch has largely been passed from father, the old and infirm Jalaluddin, to son, Sirajuddin, considered to be more aggressive, more lethal and more ideological than his father.

With the American troop surge in Afghanistan expected to begin in March, the goal of the Haqqani network appears to be to push the Americans even further on the back foot.
In response, the Americans have lately been talking about reconciliation with “moderate” Taliban in the hope of whittling down the insurgency before taking it on and preparing to exit the country. But, as we have written before, the “moderate” Taliban appear to be more a figment of desperate imaginations than a reality.

There are loosely three groups that comprise the Afghan Taliban: the group led by Mullah Omar, the Haqqani network and the Hekmatyar group. If there are going to be any talks in Afghanistan, they are going to be with those three groups, none of which could be described as “moderate”.

Further complicating the picture is the fact that there is no clear pecking order: while all militants pay obeisance to Mullah Omar as the “supreme leader”, talks with him alone cannot guarantee the Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks will toe the line of any agreement. The new year has clearly failed to bring good tidings for the Afghan government or the Americans.