09-15-2009, 03:20 PM
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It’s advantage India in the Indian Ocean
It’s advantage India in the Indian Ocean
Quote:
R S VasanFirst Published : 15 Sep 2009 11:39:00 PM ISTLast Updated : 15 Sep 2009 12:16:50 AM IST
For military and strategic analysts apprehensive of the recent Chinese overtures in the Indian Ocean, news of the defence/security agreement between India and the Maldives concluded by defence minister A K Anthony during the visit of the high level delegation from August 20-22 should provide some assurance that China will not have it all its own way in our maritime neighbourhood.
Its long-term strategic and military alliance with Pakistan has enabled China to obtain concessions from Pakistan both over land and in the maritime arena. If Aksai Chin gave China a strategic advantage on land, investment and assistance in developing Gwadar gives it maritime options in the Arabian Sea close to the Straits of Hormuz.
The regime in Myanmar leased the Coco Islands in the Andaman Sea to China in 1992, ostensibly to set up monitoring devices and for military use. India upgraded its command structure in the Andamans to an effective tri-services command more than a decade after the transfer of the said island to China.
India, however, failed to utilise the Sri Lankan offer for investing in the development of Hambanthotta due to bureaucratic delays. China lost no time by stepping in with funds for the strategic port.
As a result of these initiatives, for some years now, there has been concern in India about the ‘girdle of encirclement’ from the Northwestern Arabian Sea up to and including the Northeastern Bay of Bengal. The ‘string of pearls’ strategy remains a much-abused term to explain China’s Indian Ocean ambitions.
The Chinese have been wooing the Maldives, too, by providing aid and investment. There was talk about the use of Marao, one of the largest atolls, by the Chinese to promote their commercial and military interest. However, both due to historical and cultural relations with Maldives and the active role played by India in thwarting a coup attempt by launching ‘Operation Cactus’ in the Maldives in November 1988, ties between the two countries remain very strong.
During the Gayoom presidency India gave a lot of importance to relations with the Maldives. Relations with new President Mohammed Nasheed, popularly called Anni, have also been extremely productive and the new government’s decision to enter into a security pact with India indicates the importance both countries attach to the strategic dimensions in the Arabian Sea. The perceptions of both also appear to converge when it comes to tackling terrorist attacks.
‘Operation Castor’, under which India provided humanitarian aid and relief to the Maldives immediately after the tsunami on December 26, 2004 reassured the maritime neighbours of India’s reach and capability. With its atolls that rise just a few feet above sea level, the Maldives is highly susceptible to inundation by tsunami and global warming, requiring contingency plans to be in place. Such fears have prompted the government to scout for real estate for its citizens in other parts of the world. India obviously enjoys the positional advantage and can provide help and succour in the event of a natural calamity or man-made disaster.
More specifically, India is transferring two helicopters to the Maldives for surveillance and will also install an integrated radar network with links to naval command centres on the west coast of India. These helicopters could be used for surveillance of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and for responding to threats and disasters. From the viewpoint of Indian security in a post 26/11 scenario, India could integrate its own surveillance architecture with the Maldives. India has also gifted INS Tillanchang, a fast patrol vessel (named after an island in the Andamans) in April 2006, to the Maldives National Security Service (NSS). The vessel is now named Huravee after a freedom fighter and would be a component of the response mechanism in the Maldives waters. India would definitely be looking at an arrangement to use the southern-most second largest island that was also used by the British decades ago.
There has been active cooperation between the security forces of the two countries, and many security personnel from the Maldives are being trained in India. It has also been reported that experts from the Maldives would visit the Andaman to learn the manner in which the security of over 524 islands is coordinated by the tri-services commander.
The present development has enormous significance for India’s maritime posturing vis-à-vis China whether intended or otherwise.
It may appear that China has encircled India. In reality, forward posturing in our waters would be a challenge for China given the distances and vulnerable supply chains. In the long run, the PLA-Navy would be looking at Gwadar, Hambanthota and acquire ports in Myanmar and Bangladesh as ‘dependency ports’.
The Chinese recently deployed their frontline assets for extended periods off the Somali coast on anti-piracy patrols, demonstrating their blue water capabilities. Since leaving Hainan for the first time on December 26, 2008, the Chinese fleet has maintained an active patrol in the Gulf of Aden, rotating its units every 2-3 months. It is also interesting to note that one of the guided missile destroyer Shenzhen (DDG 167) called at Kochi on its return passage last month and exchanged notes with Indian naval counter parts. There are no doubts that the Chinese have learnt their lessons in extended operations in far-off areas. In conclusion, it appears that both China and India will continue to compete to extend their sphere of influence among the littorals in the Indian Ocean region. India is doubtless better placed to increase its influence. Of course, we must play our cards well.
(The writer is Head, Strategy and Security Studies, Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai)
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