OP-ED: India’s ‘Cold Start’ strategy —Shaukat Qadir
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...8-5-2004_pg3_3
In March this year the Indian army leaked news about the salient features of its new war doctrine. The doctrine hopes to exploit more fully India’s conventional superiority without giving Pakistan cause to escalate to the nuclear level.
The Indian army has named it ‘cold-start’ strategy since it purports to avoid the noise of a military build-up and achieve surprise. The strategy rests on operations through ‘eight integrated battle groups with elements of IAF and Navy as thrust formations’ and ‘calls for hard strikes’ limited ‘to the point which should not invite any nuclear retaliation’. What does this mean?
Given the current relationship of forces, despite India’s qualitative and quantitative edge, Pakistan could successfully defend itself against an Indian aggression. War termination strategy, which we have discussed in this space, is an important part of conflict. India is better placed than Pakistan to think up concepts and then equip its forces to operationalise them.
In the 1980s India borrowed from the Soviet concepts. One of the concepts, which we could term the “Multi-tiered Offensive Concept,” intended to simultaneously engage our front-line defensive forces while airlifting forces to engage our reserves. This was meant to upset the state of balance (‘balance’ is a product of time relationship between any force and the reserves. If a defensive force can survive the offensive for the period it takes for the reserves to reinforce it, the entire force is said to be in a state of balance).
It was a highly ambitious concept given India’s rather humble capability to airlift less than a division at a time with no artillery. But it could have been done at a critical moment in time imposing a delay on the reserves at which time it could have been most telling. Pakistan’s response was fairly easy. We ‘layered’ our reserves — i.e., infantry elements were moved closer to the front, so that if interdicted by enemy forces, some would engage them and the rest, with the armour and artillery, reroute themselves to retain the balance.
The current Indian concept has two aspects to it: one part of it retains the concept explained above, but the other seeks to offset another advantage Pakistan enjoys: the shorter mobilisation time. Because of its size, Indian forces deployed against China or located in depth, take considerable time to assemble at our borders. This time used to be about twenty days which they have perhaps managed to reduce to around two weeks. On the other hand, Pakistani forces assemble in a week’s time (at places even less) given our lack of depth. The moment news of the movement of Indian forces reaches us, we can be ready and waiting for them before their arrival.
However, for any operation, not all forces are required simultaneously. If, for instance, there are five Indian offensive divisions located within a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles of our borders, which can get there say within three days, they could open the offensive at perhaps Sialkot and opposite Bahawalnagar. If, of the remaining nine Indian offensive divisions, another three could reach the border within eight days and the five that had opened the offensive could last five days, these forces would still be in a state of balance. The remaining Indian offensive forces could initiate a delayed offensive somewhere in the south on arrival. This would be a cold start; all preliminary preparations having been completed in their cantonments, they arrive at the border to immediately go into action.
While it is definitely workable and, if well executed, very threatening, there are a number of problems with the concept.
Firstly, the timing has to be immaculate. There is no room for error. Secondly, in the north the Pakistani defensive forces are located at or very close to the border and, even the reserves are fairly close. There is little doubt that if such a concept is adopted it will rely heavily on the far-superior Indian air force, IAF, to interdict and prevent Pakistani reserves from intervening early. But if the IAF were to fail, Pakistani reserves could enter the fray early and destroy the Indian forces piecemeal.
Thirdly, the PAF, though considerably inferior to the IAF, when coupled with our fairly strong air defence system could extract a terrific toll of the IAF in a defensive battle within our own borders. That could reduce the IAF’s superiority to very acceptable proportions for the PAF for the remainder of the war.
There is little doubt that the Indian concept is a most challenging one. It demands a highly superior command over operational strategy (which is the art of bringing troops into battle such that they enjoy a greater chance of success). However, it is fraught with risk. No bureaucracy, particularly the military, produces ‘risk-takers’; in fact, they invariably die young. There is always the odd exception, but one exception is not enough. For such a concept to succeed all senior commanders down to the division level will need to have faith in it.
Risk-taking, like any other art, is honed through practice. It cannot be acquired suddenly. In military history, peacetime commanders have usually failed during wars and war itself has thrown up the required leadership, the German general staff system being the sole exception.
To take the American example; Eisenhower was a Colonel on the faculty of the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, while Mark Clark, Omar Bradley, and Patton were Lt Cols when Pearl Harbour was attacked in 1941. Within the span of less than three years Eisenhower became the supreme commandeer of the allied forces, without having commanded anything other than a regiment.
Omar and Clark rose to command army groups, while Patton rose to command an army. The sole exception was McArthur who was a general before the war began and remained successful. He resigned due to his disagreement with Roosevelt on which theatre of war should be of greater significance to the American war policy.
Neither Indian nor many Pakistani commanders are comfortable taking risks. There is far too much at stake! It is for this reason most of all that I consider it unlikely that such a concept might actually be tried. If it ever is, I would like to witness it.
The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
Pakistani Perspective On Cold Start
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