The Nuclear Suppliers Group's Shameful Silence
Not one of 45 nations could muster the nerve to condemn China's sales to Pakistan.
Non-nuclear New Zealand was an unusual chairman to guide the 46 nuclear bigwigs at the contentious meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups this weekend in Christchurch. An army of nonproliferation enthusiasts descended on the event to press for nuclear-trade guidelines to be observed by all concerned. Yet China's blatant violation, in the form of two new nuclear reactors to Pakistan, was on everyone's mind, but on nobody's lips.
China didn't elaborate publicly on its plans to provide new reactors to Pakistan, having announced its intention to have a nuclear deal by proxy with Islamabad earlier this month. Two state-owned firms agreed to build two more reactors at the Chashma atomic complex in Punjab.
Beijing justified the deal on historical grounds, citing its grandfatherly obligations to Pakistan, and also on the logic of restoring nuclear balance in South Asia. The only assurance the Chinese gave was that its nuclear commerce with Pakistan would be in accordance with China's international obligations.
Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie shakes hands with visiting Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani
Meanwhile, the United States was nowhere to be found. "India imitates China, Pakistan imitates India. What can we do to stop their nuclear activities?" a senior White House official lamented to a group of nonproliferation experts earlier this month, as though he was speaking for a weak state, not a superpower. He added the U.S. did not want to displease China or Pakistan at this juncture. American priorities today are the economy and the war on terror; two more peaceful reactors will not make much of a difference to the world. And how could the U.S. object, having agreed to supply reactors to India?
Neither did India protest, even though Chinese nuclear sales to Pakistan are a fundamental nonproliferation issue of concern to Delhi and to the NSG, more broadly. In fact, the Indian government has hardly uttered a word in public since the deal was announced.
The NSG already has guidelines for nuclear trade by its members and should decide whether the Chinese move violates those rules or not. China obviously wants to present a fait accompli rather than invite the group to impose conditions on the supply of the reactors to Pakistan. Beijing argues that the twin reactor deal was agreed before Beijing formally joined the NSG, and thus, isn't subject to current NSG rules. Beijing also points to the exception made for India in its 2008 civil-nuclear deal with the U.S.
To draw a parallel between a specific exemption given to India and the unilateral action by China is to ignore the three years of agonizing negotiations based on India's record of responsible behavior and its pressing energy needs. India separated its military reactors from civilian stations, agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency-led safeguard inspections of the latter, applied for a waiver of NSG guidelines and gave various assurances to the international community.
Pakistan, which sold nuclear-weapons technology to clients in North Korea, Libya and Iran, can hardly be equated with India. Islamabad is compiling a nuclear arsenal far in excess of the minimum deterrent that the country is supposed to possess. Pakistan is also blocking negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in Geneva precisely to gain time to accumulate more fissionable material. This is hardly an opportune time to signal acceptance of the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear program.
China's own credibility as a disciplined member of the NSG has often been called into question. Even while China has been using Pakistan as a conduit for supply of nuclear technology, it has directly assisted Iran in developing missile technology and supplied missiles to Saudi Arabia. Its nuclear activities reveal a clear strategy to use their nuclear assets to secure economic and political concessions in South Asia and the Middle East.
Placing additional nuclear capability in the hands of Pakistan, even peaceful nuclear reactors, will fly in the face of NSG guidelines. China's silence is no indication of its willingness to change its behavior. In fact, if past experience is any guide, neither China nor Pakistan can be expected to further the cause of nonproliferation. If the NSG doesn't speak out now, its very credibility will be undermined. And what will happen then?
Mr. Sreenivasan is Director General of the Kerala International Centre in Trivandrum and a Member of the National Security Advisory Board in New Delhi.
T.P. Sreenivasan: The Nuclear Suppliers Group's Shameful Silence - WSJ.com